This research investigates the evolution of the United States Government structures for integrated employment of the instruments of national power with greater unity of effort. Examination of the strengths and weaknesses of the current interagency planning and management mechanisms support the finding that comprehensive national security reform is needed. Reforms are proposed that would create a vertically integrated strategic planning and resourcing process based on greater horizontal integration at regional, joint task force, country and provincial levels. The Africa
Command structures of the Department of Defense were examined as a working model of the regional integration proposed. National level reforms include integrated strategic planning with resource balancing that could be implemented within the executive branch but would be best implemented with concurrent legislative reforms. A key element of the proposed reforms is a strengthened and empowered regional-level system of interagency commands with the responsibility and authority to integrate all instruments of national power.
REGIONAL INTERAGENCY COMMANDS: A WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE FOR COMPLEX OPERATIONS
A government ill-executed, whatever it may be in theory, must be, in practice, a bad government … all men of sense will agree in the necessity of an energetic executive … the ingredients which constitute energy in the executive are, first, unity; secondly, duration; thirdly, an adequate provision for its support; fourthly, competent powers. Over the last 15 years, the USG has tried to meet post-Cold War challenges and pursue twenty-first century objectives with processes and organizations designed in the wake of the Second World War. Operating within this outdated bureaucratic superstructure, the USG has sought to improve interagency planning and cooperation through a variety of means: new legislation, directives, offices, coordinators, "tsars", authorities, and initiatives with varying degrees of success. 2 James Locher, a former Assistant Secretary of Defense under President George H. W. Bush summarizes, "The problem we've been experiencing, whether it's 9/11 or Iraq or Afghanistan in stability operations or in the response to Hurricane Katrina, is that we could not produce that integration across departments and agencies." 3 He concludes that "if complex operations are to succeed, the nation must reorient and reform its entire national security system." Prior to the current conflicts the US conducted significant operations in Korea,
Vietnam, Grenada and Panama among other locations. Reviews of these conflicts identify many of the same issues that appear to plague the current conflicts. John
Fishel in his review of operations in Panama from 1992 concluded:
There is an absolute requirement to articulate political-military strategic objectives in terms of clearly defined end-states.
USG civilian agencies must develop the capability to conceive of strategy in terms of ends, ways, and means. Until such a capability is developed the military will have to take the lead […] Unity of effort in the interagency environment can only be achieved if all critical agencies are included in the contingency planning process. Even the combat phase of the contingency plan will require input from State and other agencies but the Civil Military Operations phase will demand very heavy participation, particularly of State, [the] Agency for International Development (AID), Justice, etc. 6 The challenges of integrating a whole of government approach to foreign affairs and national security are not new. In part some of the issues were fundamentally rooted in the US Constitution and the philosophy of the framers who sought to prevent tyranny by separating the powers of the national government. Prime Minister Churchill and the British Chiefs of Staff, the JCS mapped and issued broad strategic direction for both nations. 13 Locher notes that the JCS "not only had major military responsibilities but also collectively played crucial roles in political, intelligence, and even economic decisions". 14 
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The established method for inter-service coordination in the interwar years was mutual cooperation. After Pearl Harbor the investigating committee would note that, "the inherent and intolerable weaknesses of command by mutual cooperation were exposed." 15 Early in the war a consensus had emerged on the need for unity of command in the field. 16 Unified commands were created in each major theater of operations; however, to a great extent the war was fought along service lines. For example in the Pacific General MacArther reported to General Marshall for operations in the southwest islands but Admiral Nimitz reported to Admiral King for operations in the ocean areas. This division of command responsibilities nearly led to a disaster during the battle of Leyte Gulf.
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The rivalry between the services during the war was an appreciable handicap to the war effort. Inefficiencies led to efforts by the US Army in 1943 to unify the defense establishment under a single military department but disputes between the Army and Navy were so severe that reorganization was not seriously undertaken until after the war. 18 The worst war in the history of the planet had cost more than 50 million lives, including more than 400,000 US service men and women, and left large parts of the world utterly destroyed. In the eyes of many, US isolationism and non-interventionist sentiments had contributed to the disaster and change was needed. As the leader of the victors the US had emerged as the predominant military and economic power and The most significant among the reforms with respect to integrating the foreign policy efforts of the entire USG was the creation of the National Security Council. It was established "to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, 9 and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security." 22 The NSC structure has become the senior-level interagency coordination structure within the USG or what David
Rothkopf called the "most powerful committee in the history of the world." 23 As significant as the new council was to become, it has not been consistently understood nor used by the Presidents it has served. Understanding its evolution and struggle with its mandate in the modern world is critical for developing solutions for the problems. These areas will be the subject of the subsequent sections of this paper.
Evolution of the National Security Council
Since the creation of the NSC, its structure and function have depended upon the interpersonal relationships between the President, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the National Security Advisor and a few other department heads. The first NSC was stood up under the Truman administration and took an informal form. It was was criticized for not meeting its coordination mandate. series of sweeping changes that were intended to provide an organized, dependable and systematic staff system for advising Eisenhower. 26 The NSC was extensively transformed by Cutler "from a loosely organized entity into a formal system with an elaborate network of committees and staff arrangements." Cutler was active on both boards to ensure that they worked in a disciplined way. • strategy is so all-encompassing as to mean all things to all men
• leaders are inevitably captives of the urgent, and long-range planning is too often neglected
• authority and responsibility are badly diffused
• rigorous examination of requirements and alternatives is not made
• discipline is lacking in the budget process
• tough decisions are avoided 
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From the time the Kennedy administration eliminated the Eisenhower staff structures, the NSC has not given a high priority to strategic planning or to the alignment of resources to implement those plans. The USG "currently lacks both the incentives and the capacity to support strategic thinking and long-range planning in the national security arena." 37 Furthermore, "existing processes for ensuring that agencies actually allocate resources to reflect national security policy priorities are weak" 38 and neither the Bush Administration nor the Obama Administrations have addressed the need for a dedicated long-term planning capability for the foreign and security policy issues such as economic development and foreign assistance, support to fragile states, global health factors, the environment, climate change, or energy and resources. 39 Finally, aside from some Office of Management Budget (OMB) involvement in the Principals and Deputies Committees, the NSC structure does not integrate resource planning and execution into policy implementation effectively. "The current process and organization are not capable of carrying out common multi-year program planning for critical interagency efforts." 40 Adams writes, "without close attention to integration, much of the strategic planning that happens at NSC will be meaningless, because it has not been built into resource (human and fiscal) guidance to the national security agencies." 
NSC Committees
This doctrine of mutual cooperation implies that unity of effort can be achieved without unity of command, but can it be achieved reliably and effectively? History seems rich with examples that it is exceedingly difficult if not impossible to consistently deliver the unity of effort required to be successful in complex operations through mutual cooperation alone.
DoD Commands DoS Political Bureaus USAID Regions
Western Hemisphere Table 1 depicts the different regional boundaries of the NSC, the Defense Department, the State Department and USAID.
NORTHCOM
What seems clear from experiences in Afghanistan is that counterinsurgency operations are complex and greater unity of effort is required than can be achieved solely through mutual cooperation. There are relatively easy fixes for some of these challenges; others require deeper study and difficult compromises.
Observations and Recommendations
Taken individually the US has some of the greatest instruments of national power The NSC must be expanded to the point where it can effectively guide long-term strategic planning for the entire national security system. The persistent complex worldwide operations required to defeat modern threats demand it. An examination of the Eisenhower-era NSC staff structures yields potential solutions to many of the systemic organizational challenges preventing effective national security strategic planning and implementation. A separation of crisis monitoring/operations and strategic planning is needed. Regional strategic plans should be developed that integrate all the elements of national power for accomplishing national-level strategic objectives for USG operations within a region. These plans should be informed by sub-regional and country-level planning that reflects approved priorities at each level. Ideally these plans would be sufficiently robust to accommodate many crisis operations. At each level to the maximum degree possible the superior plan should describe the specific effects or outcomes, the "ends" desired, with guidelines for establishing accountability. Each subordinate plan should prioritize the multiple lines of effort and identify in increasing levels of detail the activities and durations needed, the "how", and the resources required from the various departments to deliver the desired outcomes.
At the most senior levels, these personnel should work within the departments while supporting the NSC with their primary focus being integration, or within the Regional Interagency Commands as described below.
Finally all plans must be reconciled with the authorized resources to establish realistic expectations. There is little benefit in planning an elaborate course of action to As currently established the national security system also lacks the "agility required to protect the US and its interests in an increasingly complex and rapidly changing world." 52 To a large degree the individual departments combine with the subcommittees that appropriate their funding and authorize their activities to create stove pipes of interest that protect their jurisdictions and prerogatives rather than seek an effective integration of the instruments of power necessary to achieve US policy.
The exacerbating effects of partisan politics as seen toward the end of both the Clinton and Bush administrations, and its paralyzing effect on US foreign policy, serve to illustrate the dysfunction possible within the US system. This dysfunction provides a critical vulnerability for exploitation. To resolve these issues legislative reform of the committee system is necessary.
Participation by Congress in national-level strategic planning is vital to set the broad strategic vision supported by the people. But a decentralized and empowered leadership must also be established within the executive to wield the instruments of power with the agility required by the modern world.
Operational Level: Regional Reforms Experience in the current conflicts demonstrates that the organizational structure led by regional USAID directors, State Department bureau chiefs, ambassadors and geographic combatant commanders will not consistently be able to accomplish the needed unity of effort. Integrated and regionally-focused interagency planning and execution requires greater unity of command to achieve effective unity of effort in complex operations. Enabling structural reform is needed.
The first step is for the President to form one or more Interagency Policy
Committees to develop common geographic partitions for use by all the agencies of the USG. Standardizing the regional boundaries of the various departments will reduce coordination requirements and facilitate integration of regional elements of national 22
power. An interagency coordination group should be able to arrive at a standard in short order once directed to do so. Second among Hamilton's characteristics was duration. Globalization makes it a US national interest to support a stable international community that can foster the entire world's "pursuit of happiness." This requires a long-term, sustained employment of national instruments that must be driven by integrated national policies and strategies. Achieving this duration will require longer-term strategic planning by all elements of the executive branch reconciled with available resources.
Third among Hamilton's characteristics was support. The legislative branch must provide sufficient resources for the top national priorities at the expense of others.
Congress must refocus its activity on the strategic national policy issues and away from the details of implementation. Presidential leadership must guide a debate among 24 those key issues to arrive at guidance that is driven by national values and interests.
Legislators must seek to educate and inform the electorate about the factors that bear on these issues without obfuscation and partisan exploitation.
Hamilton's final characteristic was competent powers. Perhaps the most vital of the characteristics is the selection of people with the knowledge and skills to accept empowerment and act effectively with the agility required. These people exist with the USG and our current organizations are overly reliant on them for success.
Unfortunately those same organizations seem woefully ineffective at producing people in the quantities required.
The United States Government structures are inadequate for making effective integrated use of the diplomatic, information, military and economic instruments of power to support US national interests abroad. This study proposes reforms that would create a vertically-integrated strategic planning and resourcing process based on greater horizontal integration at regional, joint task force, country and provincial levels managed by an expanded NSC with Eisenhower-era structures. Concurrent legislative reforms are necessary to improve resourcing and operational agility. The operational components of State and Defense would be assigned to empowered Regional Interagency Commands modeled on the Unified Command Plan that would establish unity of command and improve the unity of effort that has been lacking in recent US operations. These reforms are aimed at improving the US national security structures vitally needed for complex operations in the modern world. Although specific details may require further debate this study concludes that reform is required.
